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ROMANCING THE COURT
Jane M. Spinak*

Problem-solving courts, created at the end of the twentieth century, make court-based solutions central to addressing
significant societal problems, such as substance abuse and its impact on criminal activity and family functioning.
Yet, lessons gleaned from over 100 years of family court history suggest that court-based solutions to intractable
social problems have rarely been effective. This article asks three questions of the problem-solving court
movement: What problem are we trying to solve? Is the court the best place to solve the problem? What are the
consequences of giving authority to a court for solving the problem? Answering those questions through the lens
of specific examples from family court—the original problem-solving court—leads to the conclusion that neither
the structural issues that courts face, such as overwhelming numbers of cases, nor the momentous societal issues
that problem-solving courts have recently begun to shoulder can be adequately addressed through court-based
solutions. The factors that allegedly distinguish new problem-solving courts from earlier exemplars, especially
the family court, are both less unique and less successful than they have been portrayed by problem-solving court
enthusiasts. These factors alone fail to justify the expansion of problem-solving courts without further evidence of
their effectiveness. Moreover, the potential dangers inherent in problem-solving courts are not theoretical. By
examining illustrative examples from the history of the family court, the dangers become clearly apparent.
Keywords:
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What does it mean to be a judge? Let’s look at two models. In the first, the judge rules
on procedural issues, considers evidence, applies the law, and renders a decision. The
luckier ones sit on a court that hears a relatively small number of cases over the course of
the year and are able to structure their schedules to maximize their ability to do their job
well. If, on the other hand, a judge presides over a court that processes hundreds of cases
a week, such as a misdemeanor criminal court or housing court, that judge spends most of
the time rubber-stamping plea bargains or settlements that were negotiated in the hallway
outside the courtroom, frequently seeing the same litigants.
Then there is a second model. It may be called a drug court or a mental health court or
a domestic violence court. The judge’s role shifts to one of an active participant, even the
head of a team. All of the court professionals are committed to resolving the underlying
problems that bring the litigants to court: substance abuse, mental illness, or domestic
violence—conditions that lead to criminal activity, an inability to parent children, or
remaining safe. The court continues its oversight after determining the best way to address
these problems, monitoring compliance with the team’s expectations of the defendant or
respondent, who is frequently referred to as “the client.” The client appears regularly in
court, usually as part of team meetings. There are rewards for progress, including applause,
hugs, and cheers. When the client does not comply, sanctions are available, ranging from
more frequent court appearances to time in jail. The judge becomes a judicial leader who
works to acclimate the public to this new role as a “problem-solving” judge who is concerned with the well-being—rather than just the rights—of the people who appear in
the courtroom. While many judges support this second model, others ask whether it is
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appropriate for the judge to lead a team of professionals addressing the underlying
dysfunction of a misdemeanor drug user or a neglectful parent rather than determining
whether the power of the state can be fairly and meaningfully used to punish crime or
protect children. This article investigates that question by examining some of the work of
the paradigmatic problem-solving court: the family court.1

COURTS AS PROBLEM SOLVERS
When the founders of the juvenile court movement began their courts, they explicitly
focused on the needs of the children who would use the courts. In essence, they believed
that the criminal court, with its adversarial nature and punitive function, was unfit to
address the underlying issues that brought a young person to court: family dysfunction,
youthful antisocial behavior, and the larger societal problems manifested particularly by
poverty, immigration, and racial status. Nor was the adult court able to distinguish the
special developmental needs of children in order to treat them differently than adults. By
organizing around developmental and treatment needs, the early court was based on a rehabilitative ideal that was not rooted in the particular actions of the child or parent but focused
instead on the potential outcome of right practices on behalf of the youth.2
Alfred Kahn noted in his famous 1953 study of New York’s Children’s Court that the
Children’s Court is:
more concerned, in the first instance, not with the offense per se but rather with whether or not
the child requires special care of the State and with the nature of his specific needs. This means
that social and psychological factors enter the court’s consideration at least on a par with legal
factors. The court ceases to be a battleground between two individuals or between an individual
defending self-interest and a state concerned with the general welfare.3

Kahn’s depiction is remarkably similar to the underlying rationale for today’s problemsolving courts. Greg Berman has captured the essence of these courts as using “the authority
of courts to address the underlying problems of individual litigants, the structural problems
of the justice system, and the social problems of the communities.”4 But is this new
movement founded on something more than the ideas that gave rise to juvenile court? If
not, we may be repeating a not very successful history of interventionist family courts.
Perhaps because the modern problem-solving court movement was born in the criminal
justice system, the historic importance of the broad family court movement in analyzing the
problem-solving court paradigm has been less central than it should be. Scholars have
acknowledged similarities between the early juvenile court and the current drug courts—
particularly individualized treatment and judicial oversight—but have rarely connected the
paradigm to the broader family court experience.5
When the New York unified family court was created in 1962, it was created as a
problem-solving court to replace, in part, the Children’s Court, which was created as a
problem-solving court at the beginning of the twentieth century.6 The unified Family Court
Act (FCA) had a specific section to define the problem-solving nature of the court:
This act defines the conditions on which the family court may intervene in the life of a child,
parent and spouse. Once these conditions are satisfied, the court is given a wide range of
powers for dealing with the complexities of family life so that its action may fit the particular
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needs of those before it. The judges of the court are thus given a wide discretion and grave
responsibilities.7

New York’s broad interventionist approach exists throughout most of the country. The
restrictive language that begins Section 141—“This act defines the conditions on which
the family court may intervene in the life of a child, parent and spouse”—should be read
cautiously. The legal bases that permit the court to intervene initially in the life of a
family are either, in themselves, not very restrictive or have been interpreted to permit
intervention without sufficient restraint. So, for example, the conditions that allow a
parent to ask the state to control his or her child because the parent is unable to do so
are frequently vague and open ended.8 Yet once the conditions of intervention are met,
the court can use a wide range of powers for dealing with the complexities of family life.
But as a problem-solving court, family court has been remarkably unsuccessful. While
some of that failure can be attributed to the lack of resources—a habitual problem for
most courts—insufficient resources can obscure other reasons that family court has not
succeeded as a problem-solving court. These reasons, in turn, provide important lessons
for the newest problem-solving courts. These lessons must start with some basic questions
about the court. What problem are we trying to solve? Is the court the best place to solve
the problem? What are the consequences of giving authority to a court for solving the
problem?

THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: THE STRUCTURE OF COURTS
Systemic court problems roughly fall into three categories: the substantive issues that the
court is being asked to resolve—delinquency, child welfare, or custody—which are generally organized by case type; due process requirements within a case type, such as whether
a litigant is entitled to a court-appointed lawyer or the rules about confidentiality in certain
types of proceedings; and what Berman identified as “the structural problems of the justice
system,”9 or the process by which the court resolves the issues. Structural issues often come
to the fore during a crisis when the court is overwhelmed by cases or when resources are
more scarce than usual. When drug courts first began, their immediate goal was to address
a case-overload crisis in the courts resulting from punitive “War on Drugs” laws and the
ensuing expensive prison population. Only later did the therapeutic and problem-solving
nature of the reform begin to take hold.10 Candace McCoy, who offers a thoughtful historical perspective on the political context of court reform, posits that whatever else drug
courts may be accomplishing now, they have not solved the original goals of reducing the
caseload crisis and the glut of prisoners. One reason is that the drug courts still remain a
small proportion of the criminal court structure. A second reason is that, under the law,
most of the crimes being prosecuted in these courts are not drug crimes (which still require
mandatory sentencing), but crimes that arise out of drug use.11
A third reason may be the very nature of court reform that responds to case crises.
Courts are not responsible directly for the number of cases they handle. The ebb and flow
of cases are predominantly caused by factors beyond the court’s control. While the court
has the ability to limit cases that clearly are beyond the court’s jurisdiction or to recommend
alternative methods of case resolution to minimize unnecessary court involvement, legislative bodies determine whether an action is a crime to be prosecuted or whether modifying
a custody decree requires court power, or if “incorrigibility” is a basis for a parent hauling
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his or her teenager off to court. Responding to these legislative prerogatives through court
restructuring is unlikely to have lasting impact.
In his sweeping thirty-year assessment of California courts, Harry N. Scheiber effectively
argued that high volume, congestion, and delay are recurring problems of court systems
that will forever be under-resourced and that structural reforms, such as judicial reassignments or new forms of case settlement processes, have had limited (and mostly short-term)
effects. Scheiber concluded, “Many changes that are routinely called reforms are not truly
reformative in any way but rather are better termed ‘adjustments.’ ” 12
The family court has a long history of this type of adjustment. For example, in New York
between 1932 and 1944, all Children’s Court judges heard some truancy cases, but there
were too many of these cases for the judges to hear, not enough time to spend on them if
they were also going to adjudicate more serious cases, and a lack of uniformity in their
approaches to truancy. To improve the situation, a “School Part” with a specialized judge
was created to hear all the truancy cases and to provide extra support services to assist the
judge. Over time, however, the special part began to work like the rest of the court, having
access only to the same services as other parts.13
Having created the School Part for the purpose of focusing on one symptom—truancy—
the part increasingly had to deal with other issues underlying the child’s absence from
school. While the child’s school attendance improved while the case was open in court,
subsequent attendance and other school- or family-related problems were not resolved.
Six years later, the system was changed to rotate judges with a particular interest in schoolbased issues into the School Part. This improved the outcome on these cases but resulted
in fewer judges available for the much larger group of cases being heard in the rest of the
court. Kahn envisioned that the School Part would eventually be reintegrated into the
regular court parts, incorporating the successful practices that had been developed.14 In fact,
in less than ten years, a new law would be written to address truancy and other examples
of nondelinquent behavior that nevertheless results in family court jurisdiction.15 This shift
from general to specialized and back continues unabated in contemporary family court
reform efforts.
One form of generalization is the “one family, one judge” approach that currently has a
powerful place in family court reform ventures across the country. Any case related to a
family is sent before the same judge to ensure that overlapping issues related to the family
are addressed in a consistent manner. It also diminishes the need for families to appear in
multiple courtrooms on multiple days to address those overlapping issues.16 This approach
is consistent with the underlying purpose of a family court “given a wide range of powers
for dealing with the complexities of family life so that its action may fit the particular needs
of those before it.”17
Specialization, on the other hand, allows a judge to understand more deeply a narrower
but still complex area of law, enabling the judge to develop an expertise that produces wiser
decisions. In the late 1990s, following a period of extremely high numbers of child welfare
cases, the practice of presiding over the full range of family court cases in New York was
altered. Instead, as part of an ambitious court reform program, judges and other judicial
hearing officers were assigned to specific types of cases, such as child welfare or delinquency or support. Court administrators declared that, in response to the “epidemic” in child
welfare cases, “the court system is taking the lead through a targeted approach to neglect
and abuse,” by introducing the idea of “specialized treatment of cases.”18 Overall, this specialized treatment was intended to result in more efficient, expeditious and comprehensive
adjudication of cases.19 The alteration “reaches into the heart of Family Court operations”20
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and “fundamentally changes the way the court conducts its business in order to ensure that
the justice needs of children and families are met on a daily basis.”21 The predominant strategy was “to reduce backloads and expedite handling of all proceedings” by creating more
efficient judicial mechanisms for case resolutions through specialized parts and the addition
of judicial hearing officers to assist the judges in adjudicating cases.22
During the next several years, judges began to have greater control over their cases and
their courtrooms. Many judges were able to conduct more in-depth hearings and monitor
their dispositional orders more frequently and with more attention. Then in early 2006,
a child tragically died in New York under living conditions that had been inadequately
investigated by child protective services. The number of maltreatment cases being reported
on the child abuse hotline rapidly skyrocketed along with the number of cases being
prosecuted in court.23 The child welfare court parts were again overwhelmed. In fact,
it quickly became apparent that specialization, for the most part, had ridden the wave of
steadily diminishing caseloads in the New York child welfare system during the early years
of the twenty-first century.24 The central reason the specialized child protective judges
had a better handle on their cases was that they had significantly fewer cases—a reminder
that these types of structural changes, limited as they are by factors beyond the court’s control, cannot be the source of enduring court reform.

THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF COMMUNITIES
These social problems are the complicated substantive issues that find themselves at the
courthouse door: delinquency, child maltreatment, domestic violence, or substance abuse.
When they affect an individual, they might be characterized instead as “the underlying
problems of individual litigants.”25 The characterization is less important than the goal:
to have a significant impact on a large social problem through court-based solutions. The
National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) was founded to support the
goals of drug courts “to reduce the negative social impact of substance abuse, crime, and
recidivism” and “primary to NADCP’s work among these other [family court] drug court
models is its constant drive toward healing broken families devastated by substance
abuse.”26 In not shying away from big social goals, like healing broken families devastated
by substance abuse, how do courts, as courts, go about achieving them? First they are given
permission.
In the case of contemporary problem-solving courts, both the imprimatur of the chief
jurists of the land and the deep pockets of the federal government were essential in
legitimizing and promoting the problem-solving court enterprise. The Conference of Chief
Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators issued resolutions in 2000 and
2004 hailing the creation of these courts. The 2000 Resolution began by officially naming
these courts as “Problem-Solving Courts.” While recognizing that “courts have always been
involved in attempting to resolve disputes and problems in society . . . the collaborative
nature of these new efforts deserve recognition.”27 In fact, with the exception of California,
every drug court in the country was created by judges and not legislatures.28
Equally important in the creation of problem-solving courts was the funding that poured
into the state court systems during the 1990s. In fiscal year 1996, $5.7 million was awarded
to local drug courts, growing to $30 million only two years later. As McCoy concluded,
“the rapid growth of the movement as a whole was catalyzed by a considerable infusion of
resources from the federal government. Once federally supported drug courts had become
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entrenched in local legal cultures, state and local governments began to implement drug
courts on their own, without federal funding.”29 Problem-solving courts were similarly
encouraged in family court systems through federal funding mechanisms, including the
State Court Improvement Project (CIP).30 A central feature of the CIP was to create “model
court” family courts, a family court variant of the problem-solving court that included
family drug treatment courts. An unprecedented opportunity was being provided to dispirited local courts. Their superiors were telling them that these courts were the wave of the
future and the federal government was opening new coffers, both powerful incentives for
change. At the same time, the mission of problem-solving courts was shifting perceptibly
from management questions to therapeutic ones. In drug courts, for example, McCoy
identified this “turn” as normalizing the idea of the drug court shouldering anew a
rehabilitative approach to antisocial behavior.31 Unlike the criminal court, whose rehabilitative function had been discredited for several decades, this function had remained
more intact in family court.32

STATUS OFFENSES AND THE LIMITS OF THE
PROBLEM-SOLVING IDEAL
The truancy laws that resulted in the “School Part” that Kahn examined in 1953 were a
precursor to the 1962 Family Court Act establishing court jurisdiction over Persons in Need
of Supervision (PINS). In the earlier Children’s Court, these children were categorized as
either delinquent or neglected. The 1962 law created separate proceedings for children
committing what have come to be called status offenses because they are based on the age
status of the offender: acts that are not criminal if committed by an adult but which become
subject to court jurisdiction if committed by a youth, usually under the age of 18.33 While
New York created one of the first laws that purposefully separated status offenses from
delinquent acts, most states quickly followed suit, generating acronyms like JINS, CHINS,
or even FINS (juveniles, children, and families in need of supervision). When states created
a separate category of status offenses during the 1960s, the family court retained its proprietary responsibilities over these problems, allowing schools, the police, and parents to
turn to the court for assistance. The court would exercise its combination of protective and
coercive power to support young people and their families facing urgent problems that
seemed or were beyond their ability to solve on their own. The court would collaborate with
the probation or child welfare departments as well as community-based mental health or
treatment providers to craft solutions and then monitor the child’s and family’s progress.
Moreover, the court would, if necessary, order the child out of the home and into some kind
of placement.34
Status offender jurisdiction had many of the elements of a problem-solving court:
collaboration among service providers and the court to improve access to services, a forum
designed to resolve disputes with all the necessary parties present, and most important, a
judge with both therapeutic and coercive power to require acquiescence to court created
solutions to difficult problems. The court was treating the offender, using the potential
coerciveness of probation, detention, or placement as a means to ensure compliance with
treatment or less serious constraints, like curfews or school attendance.
There are at least four components of problem-solving courts which parallel family
court status offender jurisdiction. First, problem-solving courts separate out certain kinds
of cases for attention, organized around issues of substance abuse, mental health, domestic
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violence, or other symptoms that appear to be central to the reason why the person or family
finds itself in court. In criminal courts, similar practices are developing beyond drug courts
to include mental health and domestic violence courts. Status offender jurisdiction began
the same way. These were cases that needed specialized attention because they were neither
delinquency cases nor child maltreatment cases (though they could have been either), but
focused on particular behavior, such as truancy, that resulted in court action. Status offender
jurisdiction, like its predecessor “School Part,” focused on the symptom. The goal of a
PINS proceeding was, for example, to get a truant youth back in school. The court plays a
key role in achieving that goal.
Second, the court was an alternative forum for treating a symptom that was not
addressed or provided through other means. As in the original juvenile court, the court was
seen as a way to secure those services, either by creating them within the court system itself
or by partnering with service providers. Similarly, problem-solving courts arose, in large
part, because the courts were inundated with cases whose underlying problems, such as
substance abuse, were not being addressed adequately outside the court system. The lack
of available or effective treatment outside the court system spurred the idea of providing
that treatment within or through the court system.35
Third, both systems rely on a judge-driven—not a client-driven—solution. When the
court is given jurisdiction over status offenses, the problem is framed by asking how the
court can help parents, schools, or the police control this child. The problem is not framed
in terms of the assistance available to support this child and family, as well as the larger
community, in tackling the child’s school or behavioral or substance abuse problems. As
with newer problem-solving courts, the judge in status offense cases plays a central role,
using his or her discretion and power to craft and manage the solution.
This leads to the most significant parallel between status offense jurisdiction and
problem-solving courts: the revitalization of the rehabilitation model as a legitimate tool for
courts to employ. When families, schools, or the police turned to the court for help with
status offenders, they knew what might happen. If the youth agreed to straighten up, go to
school, listen to his folks, or get help with drugs, the youth was likely to stay home or at
least in the community. If not, the judge could remove the youth from home, placing
him or her in detention facilities or foster care placements for short or long stays. Removal
and detention became so widespread, in fact, that by 1974, barely a decade into status
offense jurisdiction, Congress enacted the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
(JJDPA), which banned status offenders from secure detention. Nevertheless, out-of-home
placements in nonsecure facilities or other institutions remained a powerful tool to compel
obedience.36
This coercive power is central to the therapeutic problem-solving court model as well.
The judge’s range of options for securing compliance with drug treatment or other requirements may range from hugs to jail, but in the end, jail remains a viable sanction. For some
civil problem-solving courts, other coercive sanctions, such as increased time spent in the
courtroom with the judge or other forms of intrusive monitoring, may take the place of
actual incarceration. In either case, the possibility of some form of sanction remains central
to the court’s coercive power. The failure of a status offender youth to obey the orders of
the court eventually results in detention or placement.37 The same is true for drug treatment
courts. The availability of sanctions as serious as incarceration is both its strength and its
potential downfall.
In an exhaustive review of rehabilitative punishment and drug courts, Richard Boldt, a
scholar of problem-solving courts, has persuasively argued that the liberal critique that
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helped to discredit the rehabilitative model of criminal justice in the mid-twentieth century is
central to examining the current drug courts.38 The liberal critique of criminal rehabilitation
effectively frames one of the central faults of status offense jurisdiction as well as what
may be an inherent limitation of problem-solving courts: the need to have some form
of punishment to compel a cure. Boldt elucidates four aspects of the liberal critique of
criminal rehabilitation before applying their lessons to drug courts. First, the possibility of
curing the individual is both elusive and heavily dependent on society’s current beliefs
about normality. A cure presupposes the availability of individualized treatment that is
usually difficult to identify and secure, especially in a massive court system. A cure also
presumes a shared societal understanding of individual pathology rather than challenging
that defined understanding. Second, the liberal critique identifies the indeterminacy of the
rehabilitation model as a form of punishment itself. The uncertainty of the outcome—
whether or not an individual will be “cured”—can itself cause the individual psychological
harm. Third, rehabilitation relies on discretion that has little scientific basis. Whether to
release a prisoner or determine who will be a recidivist or potentially abuse or maltreat a
child is based as much on “hunch, bias, and anecdotal experience” as on knowledge or
prognosis for success. Last, but central to this discussion, “rehabilitation collapses into
punishment.”39 To put it another way, you can hold out the promise of cure in a court system
only if you have the means to enforce that cure. Failure to seek or submit to a cure or even
failure to succeed in that cure inevitably leads to escalating punishment.
Four factors that status offenses share with problem-solving courts have been identified:
categorizing problems as symptoms, drawing services into the court system, creating courtdriven and managed solutions, and utilizing a treatment model that incorporates punitive
sanctions. The limitations of a court-based solution to solving societal problems complete
the analogy.
Status offenses begin in a predictable way: families come to court at the point of crisis.
Their child has run away, ignores curfews, hangs out with troublemakers, uses drugs, or
skips school. The police or school authorities either initiate the case or encourage parents
to use the court’s power to get help; sometimes the family itself has heard that the court can
do something to set their kid straight. The court, though, can often do very little to address
the immediate crisis. Intake appointments take weeks to schedule. Families often have to
come to court on multiple occasions, interfering with work and school. Accessing services
through the court often delays service delivery. Courts, moreover, continue to use out-ofhome placements as a prime tool of social control over the young person even though
research has shown that out-of-home placements often exacerbate the problems that
cause family conflict.40 Because the parent is often the petitioner, an adversarial atmosphere
pervades the proceedings.
Following the federal mandate against secure detention for status offenders, many young
people were released from incarceration in juvenile institutions and states began to use
federal dollars to develop more preventive options. Instead of eliminating status offenses
entirely, though, they increased diversion programs with the expectation that most cases
would never reach court. In New York, a diversion program that started in the 1980s
dramatically reduced the number of PINS cases for several years. Then the number of cases
began to rise again as “the enthusiasm and funding” that initially sustained the diversion
programs began to wane.41 By 2001, when the Vera Institute began to study the PINS
system in New York in response to legislation in 2000 expanding PINS jurisdiction,
approximately half of PINS cases were being referred to court, which used out-of-home
placements as a dominant tool for resolving family disputes.42 Facing as many as 5,300
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additional cases as a result of the expanded PINS jurisdiction, New York City entirely
revamped its approach to potential PINS cases, shifting precourt responsibility from
probation to child protective services and focusing on immediate assistance to families
in crisis. Upstate counties created similar reforms.43 These programs reoriented service providers and families in numerous ways: providing access to assistance as soon as the family
identifies the problem, helping the family identify its own strengths and weaknesses in
order to create individualized assistance plans, encouraging families to use alternative dispute resolution processes like mediation to resolve issues that brought the family to a crisis
point, using out-of-home respite services rather than longer term placements, and forwarding to court only those cases that have failed to settle after significant effort. These programs have significantly reduced the number of cases resulting in court referrals and court
placement.44 Even so, these programs are not a substitute for providing comprehensive
services to children and their families which would address their needs prior to reaching
the crisis point. Nor can they fully engage those families on a voluntary basis when the
threat of court action hangs over their heads: youth are threatened by their parents that
they’ll get the court to send them away from home; parents are threatened by the police or
the school system of being charged with neglect if they don’t “take out a PINS petition”;
the court threatens parents and children if they don’t follow court orders.45 As long as the
police, schools, or parents believe the court can make a youth comply, the court is seen as
the place to resolve the problem and the voluntary nature of diversion programs is
compromised.
The elimination of status offenses in some states, such as Illinois, and the significant
diversion from court in others can reformulate the approach to solving the problem. Rather
than seeing the symptom as central to the crisis—truancy, running away, drug use—the
youth is considered part of a complex family and community system that needs assistance.
In many diversion programs, the support builds on the strengths of the youth and family
and not just their weaknesses. Alternative dispute resolution processes can be used to
engage the participants in creating solutions that may differ significantly from courtcentered solutions.46 Yet even with diversion programs, substantial numbers of cases
continue to flow into the court, limiting both the assistance available for any individual
case and the court’s ability to distinguish between cases which may actually benefit from
court intervention and the ones that would be better addressed outside the court system.47
Without eliminating or severely limiting access to court in status offense cases, alternative,
community-based, or public health solutions are undermined.

THE LIMITS OF PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT SOLUTIONS
TO SOCIETAL PROBLEMS
Status offender jurisdiction is a stark but representative example of a court-based model
of intervention failing to address a significant societal problem. Turning to the factors that
make the newest problem-solving courts theoretically unique, we have to consider whether
these distinctive factors can overcome the limitations that have plagued the oldest problemsolving court since its inception. These factors are presented in the following way. First, the
new court is considerably less adversarial, with everyone collaborating on a team to solve
the problem. Second, the treatment and other services provided are superior, more readily
available, and more effective. Finally, there is far more extensive and personal monitoring by the court.
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THE LIMITATIONS OF TEAMS

Problem-solving courts should theoretically be created by the stakeholders in the justice
system. Defenders or other lawyers representing “the client,” however, may not experience
their role in the creation and execution of the courts as equivalent to that of the other stakeholders, undermining their ability—and the courts’—to create a real team. From the onset
of the process, judges and state officials possess financial and administrative control that
defenders do not share. The judicial or executive branches determine whether to create the
courts and control the funds used to do so. Defenders may disagree with the decision, preferring that the traditional adversarial system be adequately funded to protect their clients’
rights. They may also harbor serious concerns about funding the courts to provide services
to their clients that may be more appropriately funded through other treatment and social
services systems.48 Yet these are not options presented to them when problem-solving
courts are being created.
Defenders who do choose to participate as part of a problem-solving court team
anticipate that the other professionals in the court are willing to think differently about
clients, to see the client as more than just a defendant, respondent mother, or a substanceabusing truant. Part of the reason that the informal intermediate sanctions used by these
courts are believed to be effective is because the person experiencing them has a more complex and respectful relationship with the professional team.49 This belief may be hard for
defenders to sustain when, for instance, consequences for failing in the problem-solving
court—a longer jail term or termination of parental rights—may be more severe than those
if the client had never agreed to participate in the problem-solving court. Such results
challenge a defender’s justification for being a member of the court’s team.
Thoughtful scholarly investigations into the role of counsel in problem-solving courts
have posited that defense counsel cannot fully participate in the team and still shoulder the
ethical obligations of being an independent lawyer for a client.50 For example, most treatment courts require a guilty plea, admission to child maltreatment, or waiver of other due
process rights as conditions of participating in the court.51 The client has to agree to
participate when the case first comes to court before the defender is likely to know whether
waiving the client’s due process rights would make a difference in the outcome of the case.
The team defender is faced with the dilemma of having to present these institutional
requirements as the only alternative to a client who may want to participate, but not yet be
willing to acknowledge guilt or child maltreatment. The complex factors that contribute to
the client succeeding or failing in treatment are also not readily available to the lawyer at
the start of a case. Moreover, the defender usually has little opportunity to discuss the
choices that the clients face, limiting their ability to provide effective counseling.52 Rather,
as a member of the team, the defender is expected to participate in therapeutic manipulation
as part of the approval and sanctioning process, including encouraging clients to tell the
judge of their drug use or other misbehavior.53 In short, a defender may end up urging
the client to give information which will result in more jail time, being kicked out of the
program, or losing a child.
The dilemma of the defender being required to address the client’s more pervasive needs
has an apparent parallel in family court. When the Supreme Court determined in Gault that
a child subject to loss of liberty was entitled to counsel, the Court rejected the therapeutic
underpinnings of the family court when it conflicted with fundamental fairness in a delinquency proceeding.54 Some states, including New York, applied that due process requirement
to status offenses as well, recognizing that, when the state has such great power over the
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shape of an individual’s life, an independent advocate ensuring due process is necessary
for the client’s protection.55 The defender cannot be seen as having the same goals or role
as the judge, the prosecutor, the probation officer, or any other agent of the state, even if
all of them said they only wanted what is best for the child. The lawyer for the child has
a different advocacy role, a role that explicitly rejects worrying about what is best. This
historical precedent, along with the other factors identified by concerned defenders,
conveys an important lesson about the limits of a team model approach in problem-solving
courts.
THE LIMITATION OF TREATMENT IN THE COURT SYSTEMS

The second component of problem-solving courts that is supposed to distinguish these
courts from their counterparts in criminal and family proceedings is the greater availability
of treatment or other services. Given the history of family court, this distinction is weak.
From the creation of the earliest juvenile courts, providing services within the court or
contracting with outside providers for those services has been a central feature of the court.
While most family courts have fluctuated over time in providing services in or out of the
court, service provision has always been a component of the court.56 The nature and extent
of those services are critical. Drug treatment courts (and some other problem-solving
courts) have drawn down significant treatment resources. The federal and subsequent local
funding of drug and family treatment courts has made treatment increasingly available
through courts. The question is whether there has been a significant shift of treatment
resources from communities to courts. If so, the availability of treatment in the courts
skews the provision of services. Treatment that is readily available in the community could
be as effective as court-based treatment—or even better—eliminating the need, in many
cases, of creating a court-based structure.57
Status offenses provide some insight into the potential predicaments and consequences
of creating a court-based system to access treatment. First, providing treatment through the
court has the potential of net widening. If the court is the best place to get help, the client
may be more inclined to submit to the court’s jurisdiction or waive certain rights rather than
to seek more elusive help outside the court. At the same time, if the services are more available in the court, prosecutors or child welfare agencies may be more willing to bring cases
to court to get those services, even though the particular client might be as successful without court intervention for that purpose. Schools, police, and parents are more predisposed
to use status offenses to control a child if they know that the court is an available resource.
Second, the power of the court to control the child—including setting curfews, establishing
other rules, or even by removing the child from home—results in far more intrusion into
the child’s daily life. Similar restrictions on daily life by drug treatment courts have been
reported, including limitations on relationships.58 Third, despite the recent growth of
problem-solving courts, they address a relatively small percentage of the overall criminal
or family court docket.59 Taken to scale, problem-solving courts may face the same
limitations as traditional family courts: insufficient funding, inadequate services, and a
court-based solution in place without the resources for the clients. Finally, there may be less
incentive to create and fund community-based treatment resources.
Almost twenty years after the first drug court was established, the question that has yet
to be answered is whether providing treatment through the court system, rather than having
treatment readily available in the community for the same clients, makes a difference.
In studies of treatment courts, the question that is generally asked is whether the treatment
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court is having an impact on the defined goals of the case—reduced drug use, improved
school attendance, or the likelihood of reunification of families—not whether the provision
of treatment as a preventive measure would or could have achieved the same or better goals.
Studies are only now starting to parse out which drug court components matter and in
what ways.60
As these courts continue to flourish, we need to know, at a minimum, whether individualized treatment can be taken to scale; whether some of the initial successes are based
on specific attributes or experiences of the participants; whether the components that were
effective for substance-abusing adults in criminal court will also work for juveniles or
parents in family court; or even whether evaluations can be funded, developed, and completed to answer these questions.61 Given the failure of court-based assistance to achieve
the goals of status offender jurisdiction—as just one example—to improve the lives of these
children, we should be cautious in our reliance on any court-based treatment solution. And
we should be asking whether there are community-based public health initiatives that offer
better treatment alternatives than court-based solutions.

THE LIMITATION OF THE CHARISMATIC JUDGE
Problem-solving courts cannot exist without the central role of the judge. Consider this
description:
To begin with, the drug court judge deliberately departs from the kind of passive role
Tocqueville saw as a defining quality of the American judiciary. Instead, the drug court judge
is, on a number of fronts, an activist judge . . . the main actor in the courtroom drama. But the
judicial robe of passivity is also shed when the judge is off the bench. That is, the judges
actually involve themselves in the lives of clients outside the courtroom. . . . The drug court
judge’s involvement in the community, however, is not just in relating individually to drug
court clients, their relatives, or their employers. The drug court judge also plays a significant
leadership role in bringing the whole program together. . . . The very existence of a drug court
is often the direct result of the administrative leadership of a judge.62

And this one:
The importance of the work of the judges can hardly be overemphasized. Theirs is the role
which sets much of the Court’s tone, and they carry the delegated responsibility to promote
both community protection and individual welfare. They embody power and prestige which
can be used in the Court per se and in the community to protect, to help, and to rehabilitate.
In short, they are the leaders of the court “team.” For the majority of parents and children the
significance of the entire court is largely decided on the bench.63

And then this one:
It is my firm conviction that no juvenile court system can do its work well unless the judge
assumes leadership and responsibility for the entire situation: court, probation work, detention
and treatment. The judge must interpret the work of the court to the community.64

The first quotation is from James Nolan’s Reinventing Justice, his 2001 investigation of
the drug court movement.65 The second is from Alfred Kahn’s description of the New York
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City Children’s Court in 1953.66 The third is from Miriam Van Waters’ contribution to the
1925 commemoration of the first twenty-five years of juvenile court, The Child, The Clinic
and The Court.67 The juxtaposition of the three is illuminating. There is no question that the
role of the drug court judge in criminal court is dramatically different from that of his or
her colleague across the hall conducting felony trials: the defining qualities of the neutral
decision maker are nowhere to be found. But down the hall or across the street, the family
court judge conducting child welfare, custody, or status offense hearings is not dramatically different. Since the very earliest days of the juvenile court, the judge has been the
leader of the activist team.
Relying on historical accounts of the juvenile court, Nolan identified two central differences between the early juvenile court and the current drug court model. First, the early
juvenile court and the clinics associated with them were not as integrated and intensive as
the problem-solving treatment providers and the present-day drug court programs and,
second, the juvenile court judges were less involved in the daily lives of the clients of the
court.68 Yet these are differences of degree and not of kind. Both models rely fundamentally
on the concept of the judge as a charismatic leader, problem solver, team manager, and
judicial leader.69 While there are a number of family court judges who possess the energy,
dedication, and abilities to be problem solvers and judicial leaders, “few judges are really
temperamentally fitted and few are so eminently endowed as to be able to do the juvenile
work and the probation work and all the other work that must be done if the court is to be
really successful.”70 That, at least, is what Julian Mack wrote after serving on the Cook
County Juvenile Court at the beginning of the twentieth century.71
Half a century after Mack presided over the Juvenile Court, Kahn similarly lamented
that most of the judges he has observed are unable to integrate the legal and social service
tools given to them. They do not understand the psychological assistance provided by
mental health professionals, they impose dispositions riddled with personal biases about
how families should live their lives or how children should behave, they use “superficial
devices” (like an arm around the youngster’s shoulder) to show the children that they care,
and they lack effective interactive skills for interviewing and explaining what is happening
to the child. Kahn concluded:
Judges are prone to a major occupational hazard—the feeling that they can readily appraise a
situation and regularly make wise decisions not subject to question. A court in which there are
few attorneys, no representatives of the press, and practically no reviews by higher courts, yet
in which judges are called upon daily to make many decisions of major consequences, lends
itself particularly to such hazards.72

Yet some of the changes that Kahn thinks would limit the court’s personal discretion—
attorney representation, open courts, and appellate review—have not resulted in eliminating
either this “major occupational hazard” or the other limitations he identifies in judges. In
the subsequent half century, despite the tremendous growth in knowledge about child
development, family dynamics, and the impact of court processes on litigants, many judges
remain unable to integrate this knowledge in an effective balance of due process protection
and problem-solving dispositions. Nevertheless, judicial leaders continue to herald this
paradigm. On receiving the William H. Rehnquist award, Judge Leonard Edwards, a distinguished and extraordinarily dedicated family court judge, reminded his audience that the
juvenile court judge is different than the traditional judge because “in deciding the future
of a child or family member, the juvenile court judge must, in addition to making a legal
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decision, be prepared to take on the role of an administrator, a collaborator, a convener, and
an advocate.”73 Given his audience’s familiarity with the burgeoning problem-solving court
movement, he declared, “Juvenile Court is the original problem-solving court.”74
Like some of his predecessors, Judge Edwards understands the need to develop
resources beyond the court and seriously supports more client-oriented solutions. But that
is not enough to stem the tide of judicial activism that situates problem solving in the court
itself rather than in the broader structure of how people in need are served by our society.
We do not need to wait to see if the warnings about the dangers inherent in problem-solving
courts are realized. In the history of family court, they have been clearly apparent.

CONCLUSION
Addressing significant societal problems through court-based and court-structured
solutions—in particular the burgeoning problem-solving court movement—requires us to
ask whether courts are the best places to solve some of the most intractable social problems
of our time. The factors that allegedly distinguish new problem-solving courts from earlier
exemplars, especially the family court, are both less unique and less successful than they
have been portrayed by problem-solving court enthusiasts. These factors alone fail to justify
the expansion of problem-solving courts without further evidence of their effectiveness.
Moreover, the potential dangers inherent in problem-solving courts are not theoretical. By
examining illustrative examples from the history of the family court, the dangers become
clearly apparent.
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